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Abstract. We rigorously specify the class of nonprobabilistic agents
which are, we argue, immune to the classical Dutch Book argument.
We also discuss the notion of expected value used in the argument as
well as sketch future research connecting our results to those concerning
incoherence measures.
1 Introduction
Suppose you decide that your ﬁrst task on a sunny Tuesday morning is to con-
vince your friend who does not subscribe to probabilism (that is, he claims his
degrees of belief need not be classical probabilities) of the error of his ways1.
You decide to try the classical Dutch Book argument ﬁrst. To your surprise you
discover that your friend is not worried about the somewhat pragmatic nature
of the argument, allows you to set all the stakes to 1 for convenience, and, while
claiming that the set of propositions about which he holds some degree of belief
is ﬁnite, he is eager to contemplate betting on virtually anything. He also con-
siders a bet to be fair if its expected proﬁt both for the buyer and seller is null,
and even accepts the ‘package principle’, that is, believes a set of bets to be fair
if each of the bets in that set is fair. Knowing all that, when telling your friend
about how fair betting quotients are connected with the Kolmogorov axioms,
and then about the identiﬁcation of fair betting quotients with degrees of belief,
you expect him to be immediately convinced.
To your surprise he shakes his head in opposition, saying ‘I agree that fair
betting quotients are exactly those which satisfy the axioms of classical proba-
bility. Still, even when we set all stakes to 1, I don’t believe that these quotients
are my degrees of belief.’
‘But Alan’, you say, ‘this is standard. We went through this. We agreed that
if your degree of belief in A is b(A), and your degree of belief in ¬A is b(¬A),
then your betting quotient for the bet for A is that particular q for which the
expression b(A) · (1− q) + b(¬A) · (−q), that is, what you expect to be the value
1 Why Tuesday? See [7].
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of the bet, equals 0. And it is a matter of mundane calculation that q is exactly
b(A). In general this means that betting quotients are your degrees of belief.’
‘Still, look’ – your friend responds – ‘you’re missing one thing. It’s just that
in my case b(A) + b(¬A) is in general not equal to 1. My degrees of belief are
such that for each proposition A there is a non-zero number rA for which it holds
that b(A) + b(¬A) = rA; some of those numbers may be equal to 1, but none
need be. And so my betting quotient for the bet for a proposition A is in general
b(A)/rA. Can you run your argument using such quotients?’
Well, can you? It turns out that sometimes you can – but sometimes not. It
all depends on the particulars of your friend’s belief state. In what follows we
will specify the formal details. Notice that the way the story is set up, our friend
has granted you the assumptions needed to overcome the well known ﬂaws of the
Dutch Book argument (discussed e.g. in [1,17]). Still, it seems that even then
he needs not be persuaded by the reasoning. This suggests that we have here a
problem for Dutch Book arguments.
The feature of a belief function described above, which we take as suggesting
a way in which a nonprobabilist can resist the Dutch Book argument, was ﬁrst
described in print by [8] and called “negation incoherence”. In this paper we go
further:
• by saying something new regarding why and when a nonprobabilistic agent
might not violate the norm of rationality appealed to in Dutch Book argu-
ments;
• more explicitly, by proving a theorem describing the class of those nonprob-
abilistic agents which are, we believe, immune to Dutch Book arguments,
• and lastly, by discussing some diﬀerent ways in which an incoherent agent
might approach the task of calculating the expected value of some bet.
We take negation incoherence, then, as another reason for which “betting
odds and credences come apart” ([2,13]), but which, let us note here, has nothing
to do with the issues related to self-location (for the root of a big part of modern
literature on that subject see [4]). The key to our idea is that while we see
nothing wrong with the classical Dutch Book theorems, they concern betting
quotients (or odds), while the Dutch Book argument tries to establish something
about credences. If there are situations in which these two “come apart”, that
is, should not simply be identiﬁed with each other, we should either say that the
argument is not applicable (which may be a sensible road to take in the face of
self-location problems) or try to ﬁrst establish a rigorous link between them and
then to reevaluate the fate of the Dutch Book argument. The latter is the way
we have chosen for this article.2
Simply assuming that degrees of belief are to be identiﬁed with betting quo-
tients would amount to adopting some kind of operational approach to credences,
with the details depending on how the understanding of the quotients would be
ﬂeshed out. We see little gain from this, aside from a short-lived satisfaction at a
spurious connection to empirical matters. We are motivated rather by the spirit
2 We would like to thank one of the Reviewers for pressing us on this.
258 L. Wron´ski and M.T. Godziszewski
of [5]; that is, we try to keep an open mind regarding what degrees of belief
are, and investigate the relationship between them and betting quotients on a
single basic assumption: that whatever they are, they can be expressed by a real
number.
2 Details
Notice ﬁrst that assuming that in general b(A) + b(¬A) = 1 does not amount to
assuming the probabilist thesis, that is, the problem is not that of pure petitio
principii. Still, by doing so we are assuming something with which a nonprob-
abilist may by no means agree. We just know that by denying it, he has to
hold that the additivity axiom or the normalization axiom (stating that the
probabilities of tautologies equal 1) is not satisﬁed by his degrees of belief.
We can arrive at the problem from another direction. The traditional way of
looking at the Dutch Book argument for probabilism would have it imply that
possessing degrees of belief which violate classical probability axioms is a mark
of irrationality. This should be puzzling if we think about the particular form
of the ‘normalization’ axiom used in the classical axiomatization of probability.
If we believe tautologies to a degree diﬀerent from 1, we can apparently be
Dutch-booked. Surely there’s a mistake here: the choice of the number 1 as the
probability of tautologies is purely conventional. The number 2 (say) would do
just as well. But if we are careful about setting the betting quotients the way
with which our nonprobabilistic friend would agree, then if his degree of belief
in countertautologies is 0 and his degree of belief in tautologies is 2, his betting
quotient for tautologies is 1, exactly the same as in the classical case.
Let us continue towards the theorem specifying the class of cases in which a
nonprobabilist is not Dutch-bookable. In this paper we conﬁne our attention to
ﬁnite structures.
One of the main points of this paper is to identify/determine the conditions
under which it is possible to link betting quotients with credences while arguing
for probabilism. We will see that the exact identiﬁcation of betting quotients
and credences is possible when the agent is not “negation-incoherent”, and so
it should not be surprising that mathematically the betting quotient functions
and the credence (degrees of belief) functions are objects of the same type. That
is, they are functions from an algebra of events (propositions) deﬁned over a
given set (interpreted as a set of possible worlds, sample space or whatnot). The
diﬀerence between these functions, argumentation-wise, lies in their interpreta-
tions and is justiﬁed by the way the degrees of belief of a given agent induce
betting quotients in betting scenarios via the condition of fairness of bets. All
this should be clear by the time the Reader reaches Deﬁnition 4 below. Let us
start with the basic notions of belief and betting spaces:
Definition 1 (Belief space, betting space). A belief (betting) space is a tuple
〈W,Prop, b〉, (〈W,Prop, q〉) where W is a nonempty ﬁnite set, Prop is a Boolean
algebra of subsets of W (‘propositions’), and b (q) is a function from Prop to
R, called the belief function (betting quotient function).
The Stubborn Non-probabilist—‘Negation Incoherence’ and a New Way 259
In what follows we always assume that we are given a (ﬁnite) set W and a
Boolean algebra Prop ⊆ P(W ) of subsets of W (‘propositions’).
Let us now provide an intuitive description of the concept of betting quo-
tients. We say that a bet on a proposition A ∈ Prop consists of a stake s(A) and
a price p(A) (both real numbers) considered by the agent to be fair for a bet
regarding A with that particular stake (‘fair’ as in ‘not favouring either side’), as
well as the agent’s payoﬀs: s(A) − p(A) in the case A is true, and −p(A) in the
case A is false. Intuitively, the agent’s betting quotient for A equals p(A)s(A) , and is
simply the price of a bet with the unit stake s(A) = 1 considered by the agent as
fair. On our account the betting quotient is attached to a proposition, and so it
is not the price p(A) that the betting quotient depends on, but rather the other
way round: the price that the agent considers fair is determined by her betting
quotients and the announced stake. Therefore, it is already here that the Reader
might observe that a thing crucial for an accurate interpretation of Dutch Book
scenarios is understanding under what conditions the agent considers a given
price of a given bet to be fair.
With the interpretation of the betting quotient function in hand, we are in the
position to state the formal deﬁnition of Dutch Books and recall the Dutch Book
Theorems that seem to constitute the main engine of Dutch Book Arguments.
Definition 2 (Dutch Book). Let W be a non-empty (ﬁnite) set and let F ⊆
P(W ) be a Boolean algebra of its subsets. Let q : F → R be a real-valued function.
We say that q is susceptible to a Dutch Book (is Dutch-Bookable; permits
a Dutch Book) if there exists a function s : F → R and F0, a ﬁnite non-empty
subset of F , such that for any w ∈ ⋃F the following inequality holds:
U(w) =
∑
E∈F0:w∈E
(1 − q(E))s(E) −
∑
E∈F0:w ∈E
q(E)s(E) =
∑
E∈F0
(χE(w) − q(E))s(E) < 0,
where χE is the characteristic function of the set E.
We can also say in such a case that the betting space 〈W,F , q〉 permits a
Dutch Book, or that it is Dutch-bookable, or that an agent with a betting quotient
function q is susceptible to a Dutch Book (is Dutch-bookable).3
Definition 3 (Classical probability function (ﬁnite)). A function p from Prop
to R is a classical probability function if it satisﬁes the following three axioms:
1. p(W ) = 1 (the normalization axiom),
2. for any A in Prop p(A) ≥ 0 (the non-negativity axiom),
3. for any A and B whose intersection is empty p(A ∪ B) = p(A) + p(B) (the
additivity axiom).
Theorem 1 (Dutch Book Theorem - [9,10]). A betting quotient function is not
Dutch-bookable iﬀ it is a classical probability function.
3 For a detailed discussion of deﬁning Dutch Books in the more general context of
(possibly) nonclassical spaces, including a detailed discussion of the formula for
U(w), see [18].
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Let us notice that it is crucial to distinguish between:
• the Dutch Book Theorem (DBT), which is an established mathematical
result, and
• the Dutch Book Argument (DBA) for probabilism, which only uses the DBT
as one of its premises.
Let us consider that direction of the DBA which aims to establish that vio-
lating probabilism leads to violating some norm of rationality. The structure of
the argument is usually as follows:
1. Assume that a given agent’s belief function violates the classical probability
axioms.
2. Identify the agent’s credences with her betting quotients, that is, the quotients
of bets fair according to her4—this means that the agent’s betting quotient
function violates probability axioms.
3. By the Dutch Book Theorem such the agent is guaranteed a sure loss.
4. Ergo, the agent’s degrees of belief are irrational.
As the Reader sees in point 2, the argument identiﬁes the degrees of belief
with the betting quotients. This might seem close to obvious, as for instance [2]
claim5:
“All we need is for there to be a normative link between the belief and the
bet. Something like ‘Other things being equal (risk-neutral, utility linear
with money, . . . ), an agent who accepts E with 50% certainty is rationally
permitted to accept a bet on E that pays twice the stake or better’. This
link is broadly accepted, and will be all we need.”
What we intend to show in this paper is that the broad acceptance reported
in the quote above actually deserves serious and careful scrutiny—we hope to
demonstrate that it should actually be rejected and although there is a link
between the credence and the quotient, it by no means has to be identity in all
cases.
The only constraint that we have with respect to the nature of the above-
mentioned link is to make sure that the agent expects the value of the bet for
A to be 0 (assume all stakes are set to 1; nothing important in the argument
depends on that) which is a natural explication of fairness of a given bet: it does
not favour any of the sides. Thus, what we need to guarantee, while linking the
belief function b to the betting quotient function q, is that for any event A:
b(A)(1 − q(A)) − b(¬A)q(A) = 0.
4 Some variation is possible at this point. Some may prefer to speak instead about
bets the agent would accept. This will not be important for the topic of our paper.
5 Note, though, that the authors talk about and agent being permitted to accept a bet
if she does not expect her own loss, and so they do not use the concept of fairness
as not favouring either side. This is tangential to our argument.
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Notice that as mentioned above, normalization and additivity imply that for
any A in Prop b(A) + b(¬A) = 1, that is, they imply the assumption we need
for the ‘classical’ connection between degrees of belief and betting quotients, i.e.
their identiﬁcation. In our case we wish to play by our friend’s rules, that is, for
any A, we want to set the betting quotient for A to b(A)/(b(A)+b(¬A)): this way
we will make sure that indeed our friend expects the value of the bet for A to
be 0. Therefore, we may then deﬁne:
Definition 4 (Induced betting quotient). A belief space 〈W,Prop, b〉 induces a
betting quotient q : Prop → R if for any A ∈ Prop:
1. b(A) + b(¬A) 	= 0,
2. q(A) = b(A)b(A)+b(¬A) .
Deﬁned this way, q(A) is the betting quotient which makes a bet for or
against A such that an agent with a belief function b expects it to have value 0.6
It follows that if a belief space induces a betting quotient function, that is, if the
ﬁrst condition of the above deﬁnition holds, then that function is unique.
The question which now arises is the following: are there any non-probabilistic
epistemic agents (i.e. such that their degrees credences violate the classical prob-
ability axioms) that are not susceptible to Dutch Books, i.e. such that their bet-
ting quotients (induced by their credences) are not Dutch-Bookable? The answer
is given by the following simple theorem:
Theorem 2. The betting quotient function q induced by a belief space
〈W,Prop, b〉 is a classical probability function iﬀ the following conditions hold:
1. b(∅) = 0,
2. for any A in Prop b(A) · b(¬A) ≥ 0,
3. for any A and B in Prop with an empty intersection:
b(A ∪ B)
b(A ∪ B) + b(¬(A ∪ B)) =
b(A)
b(A) + b(¬A) +
b(B)
b(B) + b(¬B) .
Proof. Let q be the belief quotient function induced by a belief space 〈W,Prop, b〉.
(⇒) Assume q is a classical probability function. By the normalization axiom
q(W ) = 1, and by the additivity axiom q(∅ ∪ W ) = q(W ) = q(W ) + q(∅), so
q(∅) = 0. Thus b(∅) = q(∅) · (b(∅) + b(W )) = 0.
Let A ∈ Prop. By the deﬁnition of the induced betting quotient we have
b(A) · b(¬A) = [q(A) · (b(A) + b(¬A))] · [q(¬A) · (b(A) + b(¬A))] = q(A) · q(¬A) ·
(b(A) + b(¬A))2. As the function q is non-negative and we multiply the square
of (b(A) + b(¬A)), the value of the entire expression is ≥ 0.
The last condition holds since it basically says that q(A) + q(B) = q(A ∪ B)
for disjoint sets in Prop, which is guaranteed by the additivity axiom.
(⇐) Assume the conditions form the statement of the theorem hold. Trivially,
since b(∅) = 0 and q is induced by b, it holds that q(∅) = 0 and q(W ) =
0 + b(W )b(W )+b(∅) = 0 +
b(W )
b(W )+0 = 0 + 1 = 1, so normalization holds.
6 For more regarding the notion of expected value see Sect. 4 below.
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Let A ∈ Prop. We have q(A) = b(A)b(A)+b(¬A) , and b(A) and b(¬A) are of
the same sign (or one of them is equal to 0). Thus, both the counter and the
denominator of the formula deﬁning q(A) are of the same sign as well (or the
counter is equal to 0). Thus, q(A) ≥ 0.
The additivity of q follows trivially from the formulation of the third
condition. unionsq
It is worthwhile to reﬂect on which steps of the above proof depend on what
properties of the classical probability measure on the one hand, and the induced
betting quotient on the other. If b satisﬁes the conditions in the statement of the
theorem, then the normalization axiom is implied just by the fact that b(∅) = 0.
Additivity is immediate in both directions of the reasoning. On the other hand,
the same sign of the belief function on complementary events follows from the
non-negativity of q, if the latter is the quotient function induced by b. However,
the value b(∅) = 0 follows from (the conjunction of) normalization and additivity
of q. That is, it is not the case that the conditions in the statement of the theorem
correspond directly to the respective probability axioms.
3 Discussion
To see an example of a Dutch-bookable, nonprobabilist belief space, consider the
space with three atomic propositions depicted in Fig. 1.
1
1/2 1/2 1/2
1/3 1/3 1/3
0
degrees of belief
to the left
induce
betting quotients
to the right
1
3/5 3/5 3/5
2/5 2/5 2/5
0
Fig. 1. A nonprobabilist, un-Dutch-bookable belief space and its induced betting quo-
tient function.
That is, consider 〈W,Prop, b〉 where W = {w1, w2, w3}, Prop = P(W ), and
b : Prop → R takes the values b(∅) = 0, b(W ) = 1, b({wi}) = 13 for each
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and b({wi, wj}) = 12 for distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then the induced
betting quotient function q is as follows: q(∅) = 0, q(W ) = 1, q({wi}) = 25 for
each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and q({wi, wj}) = 35 for distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
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(Where a similar illustration appears in the remainder of the paper we shall
use the same representational convention, that is, the left algebra represents
the function b deﬁned on P({w1, w2, w3}), and the right algebra represents the
induced betting quotient function q.)
We can see that the betting quotient function q does not satisfy the classical
probability axioms (it is not additive), therefore by Theorem1 the belief function
b is susceptible to a Dutch Book. We can see observe that the belief function b
does not satisfy the third condition of Theorem2, e.g.
b({w1, w2})
b({w1, w2}) + b({w3}) =
3
5
= 4
5
=
b({w1})
b({w1}) + b({w2, w3}) +
b({w2})
b({w2}) + b({w1, w3}) .
−3
−1 4/3 −5/3
−1/3 2/3 −1
0
degrees of belief
to the left
induce
betting quotients
to the right
1
3/6 4/6 5/6
1/6 2/6 3/6
0
Fig. 2. A nonprobabilist, un-Dutch-bookable belief space with a “wild” belief function.
For a contrasting example, Fig. 2 depicts another nonprobabilistic belief
space. As we can see, the induced betting quotient function may be a classi-
cal probability function even though the original belief function does not seem
to be anything reasonable.
Note that you do need to subscribe to any particular interpretation of belief
functions to accept the above argument (for a survey see the already mentioned
[5]). The only two things that are needed are that you agree that degrees of
belief can be expressed by a real number (so that, for example, you are not a
strong operationalist) and agree to our description of the relation between them
and the betting quotients.
Notice also that having negative credences—whatever this would mean—does
not by itself make you prone to Dutch-Books. You might be exploitable in some
ways, and so holding such credences might be irrational. But the main goal of
this paper was to distill the essence of the power of the Dutch Book arguments,
and from the above Theorem we see that it does not exclude negative credences
as irrational.
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4 How to Expect Things When You Are Incoherent
We have intentionally used expressions like “the agent expects the bet to have
value 0” instead of “according to the agent the expected value of the bet is
0”. Consider the following argument (notice that for clarity we have omitted the
phrase “according to the agent”, but it should be immediate where it is intended
to ﬁgure):
1. A bet is a random variable;
2. a fair bet is deﬁned as one that has expected value 0;
3. a fair set of bets is deﬁned as one that the expected value of the sum of all
the bets in the set is 0;
4. the expected value of a sum of ﬁnitely many random variables is equal to the
sum of expected values of those random variables;
5. therefore, a ﬁnite set of bets all of which are fair is also fair;
6. therefore there are no ﬁnite Dutch Books.
Since the conclusion of this argument is false (examples of ﬁnite Dutch Books
abound), we need to see where it fails. Since a bet outputs a real number (proﬁt)
given an element of the sample space (possible world), it can be thought of as a
random variable, and so step 1 is true. Steps 2 and 3 are deﬁnitions. Step 4 is
a basic fact about random variables. Step 5 follows from the previous four, and
step 6 is just a reformulation of 5.
So, what is wrong? The culprit is step 2. Yes, it is a deﬁnition, but its
application to an incoherent agent yields probably unintended results. Compare
deﬁning, for an agent with a belief function b, the expected value of a bet for A
which pays 1 and costs q as
b(A) · (1 − q) + b(¬A) · (−q) (1)
(as is done e.g. by [17]; we have used the same formula in the previous sections)
with putting it as
∑
w∈A
b({w}) · (1 − q) +
∑
w/∈A
b({w}) · (−q). (2)
These two expressions may be diﬀerent for agents with a nonadditive belief
function. (Notice that the former, and not the latter, is, mathematically speak-
ing, the expected value of the bet, considered as a random variable: see e.g.
Deﬁnition 4.1.1 in [14].) It seems that an incoherent agent may respond to our
result in Sect. 2 by saying “that’s all very nice, thank you very much for defend-
ing me, but really, I expect a bet for A to have value 0 precisedly when (2) is 0,
that is, I am using this atomic notion of expected value just like it is employed
in esteemed publications like [6, p. 615] and [12, Chap. 14]. And so my alleged
Dutchbookability is a matter of a diﬀerent calculation!”
But is that option really available to the agent? It seems to us that the
answer is “no”. When ﬁguring the relevant betting quotient the agent considers
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the payoﬀ in the case of winning the bet, the payoﬀ in the case of losing it,
and takes into account how probable he or she thinks the two outcomes are,
that is, his or hers credences in the proposition (because the bet is won if the
proposition is true) and its negation (because it is lost if the proposition is false).
The agent’s credences in the constituents of the proposition are irrelevant to this;
and so, the correct formula to be used is (1). This is of course debatable: but we
are willing just to say that at this point the non-probabilist, even though—as
pointed out—she could appear to the existing literature, would truly become
Stubborn.
4.1 Conclusions
Thus, even if we forget about all the problems of Dutch Book arguments which
are usually mentioned in the formal epistemology literature (see e.g. [1,11,17]),
it turns out that another one lurks in the basic step of connecting degrees of
belief with betting quotients. There is a gap between betting quotients, which
theorems in Dutch-Book-inspired formal epistemology are about, and degrees
of belief, which those theorems are supposed to be about. This gap prevents
the classical Dutch Book argument from being convincing to the target group,
that is, nonprobabilists. We propose to bridge that gap using the notion of
induced betting quotient; and show that susceptibility to a Dutch Book remains
a nontrivial notion: some nonprobabilists are immune, but others are not.
5 Relation to Incoherence and Inaccuracy Measures:
Some Preliminary Remarks
Since the context of this paper is an argument for probabilism, we have conﬁned
our attention to a binary notion: either the agent can be Dutch-booked, and so
is irrational, or not, in which case if (s)he indeed is irrational, we need a diﬀerent
argument to show it, since everything seems to be ﬁne about her or his credences
at the given moment. This is ﬁne if we are interested in norms of rationality of
ideal agents and what exactly it takes to satisfy them. However, if we think
of real agents, who—reason would dictate—can only aspire to the probabilistic
ideal, or if we would like to compare diﬀerent violations of probabilism displayed
by ideal agents, some graded notion is needed: one which would aim to capture
the “distance” between an agent’s belief function and some maximally “close”
coherent function. (The word “distance” is in quotes since the two-argument
functions used in the literature may not be metrics; see e.g. [12].)
One approach would be to use a notion of Dutch Book which would enable
us to ask questions regarding “how Dutch-bookable an agent is”, for example,
intuitively, how much money can be extorted from the agent (assuming some
normalization is used). This road is taken by [15]. We have tried to make our
paper acceptable to those who think one fault of the classical Dutch Book argu-
ment for probabilism from the point view of epistemology was its pragmatic
nature; we have thus decided to use a relatively strict notion of a “a bet the
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agent considers as not favouring any side”, and not something similar to “a bet
the agent would accept since (s)he considers it to have a nonnegative expected
value for her or him”, which is the notion Schervish et al. use. We do not know
yet how our approach fares if we switch from one notion to the other—this is a
task for the future.
The approach by Schervish et al. has been criticised by e.g. [16] on both tech-
nical and philosophical grounds, but at least one of their incoherence measures,
the “neutral/max” one, stands its ground, and we will consider it in the future.
The basic question to be asked is the following. Consider the class N consisting
of all nonprobabilist agents which cannot be Dutch-booked (according to a ver-
sion of our argument which takes into account the class of bets interesting from
the point of view of Schervish et al. described above) and the class M consisting
of all nonprobabilist agents which can. Are all members of N less incoherent
according to the “neutral/max” rule than all members of M?
Another route to consider would be to investigate how members of the classes
N and M fare from the standpoint of alethic accuracy (on that notion consult
[12]). However, it is not evident what kind of question should be asked in this
context. The relationship between graded incoherence and alethic inaccuracy has
not been completely worked out and research in that area is ongoing: see e.g. [3].
There seem to be no “simple” theorems to look for in this area; for example, as
shown in [3], promoting one virtue does not in general result in promoting the
other. Just like in the case of the issues discussed in the previous paragraph,
the number of implicit quantiﬁers involved in researching such issues makes the
number of potential formal hypotheses quite high. However, at this moment
we are sceptical regarding the outlook of similar endeavours. Consider the non-
probabilist belief space from Fig. 3: on any reasonable inaccuracy measure its
“distance” from the closest coherent function will be minimal, and yet it belongs
to the class M : it is Dutch-bookable. We will pursue these issues further in [19].
1
0.399 0.8 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.601
0
Fig. 3. A belief space which is negation coherent (and so featuring degrees of belief
which are betting quotients) and Dutch-bookable (since the betting quotients are not
additive), but intuitively very close to a classical space.
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